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Abstract
This study addresses the dynamical nature of a “representation-hungry” cognitive task involving
an imagined action. In our experiment, participants were handed rods that systematically increased or
decreased in length on subsequent trials. Participants were asked to judge whether or not they thought they
could reach for a distant object with the hand-held rod. The results are in agreement with a dynamical
model, extended from Tuller, Case, Ding, and Kelso (1994). The dynamical effects observed in this
study suggest that predictive judgments regarding the possibility or impossibility of a certain action
can be understood in terms of dynamically evolving basins of attraction instead of as depending on
representational structures. © 2002 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The ability to think about the outcome of a yet to be performed action seems to neces-
sitate a representational explanation. It seems difficult to explain this ability unless one as-
sumes that the system constructs a model of the situation, represents the imagined action,
and concludes on the basis of the ensuing representational structure whether the goal can be
achieved by means of the action or not. In this paper, we aim to question this representational
presupposition by investigating the potential of dynamical systems theory (DST) to model
imagined actions. According to some (but not all) proponents of DST, a non-representational
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account of behavior is possible and in many cases more fruitful for understanding the under-
lying causal processes (Kelso, 1995; Keijzer, 2001; Port & Van Gelder, 1995; Skarda, 1986;
Skarda & Freeman, 1987; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Van Gelder, 1995, 1998). Within DST, the
behavior of a system is analyzed as an emergent property of the interactions between its sub-
systems. During the last decade, the tools of DST have proven to be valuable assets for under-
standing behavior emerging out of multiple interacting components. This behavior ranges from
rhythmic movements of fingers and hands (cf. Amazeen, Amazeen, & Turvey, 1998; Beek,
Peper, & Stegeman, 1995; Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 1985; Jagacinski, Beek, & Peper, 2000) to
the temporal patterns of social interaction (cf. Schmidt, Carello, & Turvey, 1990; Vallacher &
Nowak, 1994).
It is often considered to be difficult to apply DST to what could be considered to be genuine
cases of cognition (see, however, Haken, 1990 on pattern recognition; Thelen, Schöner, Scheier,
& Schmidt, 2001 on the A-not-B task; Townsend & Busemeyer, 1995 on decision making;
Vallacher, Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994 on dynamics of social judgment). Indeed, DST has been
challenged explicitly to try to deal with more “representation-hungry” domains (Clark &
Toribio, 1994; see also Clark, 1997, pp. 166–170). One such domain, according to Clark, in-
volves the class of cases that “include thoughts about temporally or spatially distant events
and thoughts about the potential outcome of imagined actions” (Clark, 1997, p. 167; our em-
phasis). We consider this challenge to be a rather formidable but justified one. In the present
paper, we aim to indicate a possible path along which one can attempt to answer the challenge
by Clark. We explore whether and how participants’ verbal reports about imagined actions can
be understood from within a DST approach. This paper presents an example of how this path
could be empirically validated.
1.1. Categorizing imagined actions
The task we will be focusing on is the judgment whether or not it is possible to displace
a distant object with the aid of a hand-held rod. While standing at a fixed position partici-
pants held a rod and were asked to imagine whether or not they would be able to displace
an object with the rod. They expressed their judgment (by responding either “yes” or “no”)
without actually trying to reach and displace the object. Thus, participants had to imagine the
outcome of an action and discriminate between those instances in which the action is deemed
to be successful from the ones that are not. Regarding our task, we would like to stress that
the participants engage in a categorization not of stimuli or actions, but of imagined actions, in
the sense that ideas and judgments about possible states or events in the world are formed with-
out actually performing the action. The participants give judgments about an action-dependent
situation that is not present to their senses.
From a Gibsonian perspective, the task can be interpreted as requiring participants to judge
whether an object affords to-be-displaced by a given rod. The term “affordance” denotes the
possibilities for action of an environmental layout with reference to a person’s capabilities
for action (Gibson, 1979; Turvey, 1992). Warren’s (1984) investigation of affordances in rela-
tion to stair climbing provides an approach that is in some respects congenial to our own. He
presented participants with slides of wooden stairways with different riser heights and asked
their judgment regarding the climbability of the stairs. From this perspective, our investigation
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could be interpreted as related to the perception of affordances or to, as Warren (1984, p. 699)
puts it, as a form of “perceiving the ‘work to be done.”’ Yet, this is not contradictory with
our interpretation of the task as being representation-hungry, for precisely from the traditional
cognitivist perspective it has been argued that the direct pickup of affordances is, ultimately,
a representation-laden process (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981). The reason that we do not interpret
our task in terms of affordances is first of all that we want to stay clear from the long-standing
debates that surround this notion (e.g., see the discussion between Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981;
and Turvey, Shaw, Reed, & Mace, 1981). Moreover, from a Gibsonian perspective one would
search for the invariances in the ambient array and how this information specifies an ac-
tion (cf. Michaels, Zeinstra, & Oudejans, 2001; Turvey, 1996). As Warren (1984) did for the
stair climbing task, we could search the invariant that observers use in our task. To do this,
one could, for instance, vary the properties of the to-be-displaced object, or properties of
the rod other than length. However, in the present paper, we aim to find a way of answer-
ing Clark’s representation-hungry challenge and we are less interested in the identification
of the variable that guides the judgment in this specific task. Although, we were partly in-
spired by the Gibsonian perspective and we see the intuitive connection between this approach
and our work, we think that our major aim requires another approach. In agreement with
Michaels and Beek (1995), who evaluate a Gibsonian approach and a dynamic systems ap-
proach for understanding perception and action, we believe that each approach fits its own
domain of questions. Given our interest in understanding how the dynamics in our task can
explain the imagining of the outcome of an action we take the dynamic systems approach as
our starting point.
Yet another perspective on the nature of the task can be derived from noting the similarities
between what participants have to do in our task and aspects of the preparatory phase of an
act where an individual has to judge whether the intended action is possible or not. In this
respect, our task could be considered as an example of prospective control. Reaching requires
anticipating forces and exploiting the joints available for the action. This implies that judging
whether or not a reach is possible requires perceiving prospectively how relevant variables will
affect the action. Hence, the judgment of the (im)possibility of an action is a complex problem in
which a large number of variables and their interactions need to be taken into account. However,
there is a subtle but important difference between actually performing a displacement task and
the circumstances in our experiment. In the current task, participants have to imagine whether
the displacement is possible with the rod; participants never actually displace the object with
a given rod. This implies that at no instance they can rely on proprioceptive or visual feedback
about the accuracy of their judgment. This is completely different from a situation where at
any instant the action can be adapted or even aborted given the information about the action
that becomes available in the act. Thus, the constraints on the judgment are much tighter in the
present judgment situation than in a situation where the displacement actually is performed.
No feedback is available which implies that participants can only rely on how they imagine
their action possibilities with the rod.
What are factors that participants should use in the present imagination task? Judging
whether a rod would enable displacing an object from a certain distance requires prospec-
tively establishing not only the length of the rod but also the maximally possible extension of
the arm and the forward bending possibilities of the trunk and legs while controlling the rod.
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Hence, judging whether a rod can be used to displace an object is not just simply matching the
length of the rod to a reference length (i.e., the distance to the object) but judging whether there
is a “posture+ rod” that can bridge the gap to the object. Participants have to imagine whether
they can control the rod during displacement with a posture that maintains balance. The posture
that is possible depends on the properties of joints and muscles that perform the action. Making
an accurate judgment regarding the (im)possibility of a reach with a rod involves (a) detecting
information about the forces that operate on the body, as well as (b) detecting information
about the joints and muscles available for performing the action.
When performing actions, upcoming forces are detected and postural adjustments take place
to maintain balance given those forces. Several researchers have measured postural adjustments
and muscle activity before and after the start of fast shoulder flexions bringing an arm at the side
to the horizontal (Aruin & Latash, 1995; Bouisset & Zattara, 1981, 1987; Brown & Frank,
1987; Horak, Esselman, Anderson, & Lynch, 1984; Lee, 1980; Lee, Buchanan, & Rogers,
1987; Van der Fits, Klip, & Van Eykeren, 1998; for an overview see Massion, 1992). In gen-
eral, these studies report an increase in EMG activity of postural muscles prior to or in an early
phase of the arm movement (depending on condition); this suggests that this activity has an
anticipatory component. If load increased, the EMG activity increased or the onset of the antici-
patory activity was earlier, dependent on condition (Aruin & Latash, 1995; Bouisset & Zattara,
1987).
However, not just the forces are important, but also the joints involved in the completion
of the act. In several studies, the actual maximum reaching distance is compared to the per-
ceived or judged maximum reaching distance. Several studies report an overestimation of
the judged maximum reaching distance when only one joint (i.e., the shoulder) is to be used
(Carello, Grosofsky, Reichel, Solomon, & Turvey, 1989; Robinovitch, 1998). In that case it
seems that participants judge the maximum reaching distance as if more joints, such as the
hip and ankle, are also available to make the reach (cf. Rochat & Wraga, 1997). This implies
that the question of how many joints are available for an act is important for the judgment
concerning a reaching possibility.
Bongers and co-workers (Bongers, 2001; Bongers, Smitsman, & Michaels, 1998, 1999)
studied postural adaptations when reaching with rods and whether postures were anticipated.
They asked participants to hold a rod with the tip in the air, walk toward an object, choose a
place to stop, and displace the object with the rod’s tip. In different experiments length, mass
and mass distribution of the rod and size of the to-be-displaced object were varied. Those
manipulations of the rod should affect the posture with which the rod could be controlled and,
thus, should be anticipated in the selected distance to the object. It was found that not only the
length of the rod but also the required posture affected the chosen distance to the object. In other
words, participants prospectively adapted the distance according to the length provided for by
“posture+ rod.” The early adaptation of the actions suggests that participants can use similar
information when they have to imagine the outcome of an act. On the basis of this, we argue
that participants judge posture + rod-length when they imagine whether displacement with
a rod is possible. Therefore, imagining postural aspects (for instance, controlling the rod and
maintaining balance) are important in our task. So, our task can be called representation-hungry
because it requires participants to engage in a prospective form of perception without receiv-
ing feedback, which, moreover, involves the combination of information across a variety of
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domains (i.e., visual and kinaesthetic) in relation to an estimation of possible body posture,
which involves the anticipation of forces.
Finally, Heft (1993) provides what could be taken as an empirical test of our claim that the
task requires more complex forms of cognition than pure perceptual comparison. The test is
based on the phenomenon of overestimation of reaching distance. According to Heft (1993)
under certain circumstances the estimation of reaching distance is less precise than what may
be expected on the basis of perception–action abilities of individuals. He suggests, based on
Helmholtz’s (1925) concept of ‘unconscious inference’ that “when individuals ‘intellectualize’
in the process of making a perceptual (i.e., nonintellectual) judgment (. . . ) their performance
will be adversely affected” (Heft, 1993, p. 258). His experimental results indicate that over-
estimations of reaching distance “reflect the intrusion of nonperceptual processes” into more
basic cognitive processes (Heft, 1993, p. 266). Imagining the outcome of an action is an ex-
ample of such ‘nonperceptual’ processes. Following Heft, then, we propose that the finding
of substantial overestimation of reaching distance would provide at least suggestive evidence
that people are taking a more cognitive, or representation-hungry approach to the task. We will
return to the issue of overestimation of reaching distance in Sections 4 and 5.
In all, we claim, our task presents a simple, yet clear case of a representation-hungry phe-
nomenon. We wish to contrast our dynamic account of this task with a traditional computational
account according to which the relevant variables are represented within the cognitive system,
which then computes whether the intended or imagined action will lead to the desired result
(e.g., by comparison of the situation with an internal standard). In the case of our task this
would mean that a participant is assumed to be primarily engaged in a comparison between the
representations of the length of the rod, the postural possibilities and the estimated distance to
be bridged. The successfulness of the imagined action is thought to be established on the basis
of calculations transforming these representations.
1.2. Representations: are they always necessary?
The notion of “representation” has for a long time been a corner stone of cognitive science.
A definition that is often used in recent debates on representation is given by Haugeland (1991,
p. 62):
A sophisticated system (organism) designed (evolved) to maximize some end (e.g., survival) must
in general adjust its behavior to specific features, structures, or configurations of its environment in
ways that could not have been fully prearranged in its design. [. . . ] But if the relevant features are not
always present (detectable), then they can, at least in some cases, be represented; that is, something
else can stand in for them, with the power to guide behavior in their stead. That which stands in for
something else in this way is a representation; that which it stands for is its content; and its standing
in for that content is representing it.
Another famous interpretation is given by Newell (1980, p. 156):
An entity X designates an entity Y relative to a process P, if, when P takes X as input, its behavior
depends on Y.
The basic idea of these two definitions is the same. The two most important features of
representations are, on this account, that a representation stands in for something not (reliably)
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present, and that the system uses the representation in order to guide its behavior. According
to traditional cognitive science, then, representations play a double role: they carry content
and they cause behavior. Even though classical cognitive science and standard connectionism
disagree about the actual format of representations, they share this much.1
It is perhaps wise to make clear from the outset that we are not arguing against representa-
tions across the board. Instead, we are more interested in seeing how far one can go without
invoking representational explanations. Our motto, then, is not “away with representations”
but rather something like: “don’t use representations in explanation and modeling unless you
really have to.” That is, we object to the widespread tendency within cognitive science to take
representations as an unavoidable and unobjectionable starting-point. There are several reasons
for our position in this, which we will outline briefly below.
First of all, in the context of planning, a representational account of imagined action leads one
into the quicksand of the frame problem. Adequately representing all possibly relevant aspects
of the situation and all possibly relevant consequences of actions quickly becomes computa-
tionally overwhelming (Haselager, 1997; McCarthy & Hayes, 1969; Pylyshyn, 1987). Thus, a
system that should be capable of acting intelligently in the world soon is smothered by its own
representational resources.
Secondly, the exact benefits of the available forms of representation has become a mat-
ter of heated argument. The classical view on representations, i.e., symbolic structures in a
well-organized representational scheme (Fodor, 1975; Newell, 1980), is no longer universally
endorsed within cognitive science. Since the rise of connectionism and the notion of distributed
representation in the 1980s there has been an intense debate on what would constitute an ef-
ficient way of representing information. Both camps have indicated serious reasons to doubt
the validity of the other camp’s representational scheme (e.g., Aizawa, 1997; Chalmers, 1993;
Churchland, 1989; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; Hadley, 1994; Haselager & van Rappard, 1998;
Horgan & Tienson, 1997; Smolensky, 1988). We see the current widespread disagreement on
what would constitute a viable form of representation as an indication of the fact that the
representational foundation of cognitive science may not be all that rock-solid.
Finally, the response given to DST’s anti-representationalist claims (e.g., Van Gelder, 1995)
by defenders of the representational position (Bechtel, 1998) makes clear that the meaning
of the notion of representation has widened to such an extent that even simple mechanical
devices (e.g., a steam-regulating device such as the Watt Governor) are considered to have
representations. In our view, this makes it debatable whether the notion of representation has
enough substance to play a useful role in the explanation of the causal mechanisms underlying
truly cognitive systems (Haselager, de Groot, & van Rappard, submitted).
These considerations are, of course, far from being decisive. Still, we submit that they
provide enough incentive to attempt to explain and model cognitive behavior without assuming
representations from the start.
1.3. Being representational without representations
An explanation of cognitive capacity in representational terms is only valuable if, as
Clark (1997) puts it, representations are usefully individuable. By this he means that the rep-
resentation must be distinguishable as an entity serving a role as an information-carrier for
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behavior. But what if, as DST would have it, a behavioral pattern is best understood as an
emergent property of the overall activity of the system? Clark argues that
[a representation] will not be usefully individuable if (. . . ) it somehow involves such temporally
complex and reciprocally influential activity across so many subsystems that the “standing in” is best
seen as an emergent property of the overall operation of the system. In such cases (if there are any),
the overall system would rightly be said to represent its world—but it would not do so by trading in
anything we could usefully treat as internal representations. (Clark, 1997, p. 168)
So, even if in some cases one could view a system as a whole as representing something, it
does not follow that one needs to posit “stand ins” in the causal explanation of that particular
behavior. If it can be shown that the system’s state is best seen as an emergent property of the
overall operation of the system, a non-representational account seems the most natural way
of analyzing the system. We submit that if imagined action can be fruitfully interpreted as
an emergent property of the whole system, supposing an internal representation processing
mechanism (representation in a causal–realistic sense of the term) is at best superfluous or at
worst misleading.
The term “emergence” is not without problems. As Bechtel and Richardson (1993, p. 229)
note, on the one hand the term is used too easily, applying to simple cases where the whole
has properties not had by its components (e.g., a square has properties that its constituent line
segments do not have). On the other hand, the term is used in relation to more interesting
cases but without (or sometimes even instead of) a proper explanation of how the interaction of
components is related to the emerging properties. In the present paper, we do not refer to emer-
gent properties as properties of a system that has initially uncorrelated particles that become
coordinated, such as the famous example of the Bénard cells (cf. Juarrero, 1999; Rosen, 1978;
Thelen & Smith, 1994). Instead, we are interested in how different behaviors (i.e., the different
judgments) emerge from the state the system (i.e., a participant) is in. Part of our interest in DST
is derived from the fact that it provides the mathematical resources for a more solid interpreta-
tion of the notion of emergence (Haken, 1977, 1983; Haken & Wunderlin, 1990; Kelso, 1995).
1.4. Dynamical systems theory
Dynamic systems models typically describe behavior on the level of the whole system.
On this account behavior is seen as a self-organized pattern, emerging from the interaction
among subsystems. Such a pattern is called the collective variable or order parameter, which
in turn can “enslave” the behavior of the components (cf. Haken & Wunderlin, 1990, p. 7;
Kelso, 1995, pp. 8–9). Despite the great complexity at the level of the interacting components,
the behavior of the system as a whole can be described in terms of low-dimensional order
parameter dynamics. Differential equations can be used to describe the overall behavior of the
system, and potential functions capture the long-term behavior of the dynamics underlying
the system’s behavior. The potential function can be interpreted as describing an attractor
landscape, in which the wells function as attractors and exemplify relatively stable states/modes
of behavior. The attractor landscape may change and attractors can disappear or originate. As a
consequence, transitions between different modes of behavior can be induced. The parameters
that lead the system through these different behavioral patterns are called control parameters.
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Although their name suggests otherwise, control parameters may be quite unspecific in nature,
that is, in no sense do they prescribe the emerging pattern.
In a dynamic system, the order parameter is continuously defined, since all possible states
are assumed to lie on a continuum referred to as state space. However, under the regime of a
given order parameter it may be that only certain, more or less “discrete,” regions of the state
space are stable. Even though transitions from one such “qualitative state” to another must
theoretically involve a trajectory through all intermediate states, there is still only a limited set
of states that can be maintained for long enough to sustain an overt judgment (in our model
there are maximally two such regions of possible stability, “yes” and “no”).
The control parameters and order parameters governing dynamical systems are generally
unknown. The key to studying a cognitive system then is to make the dynamics underlying the
system’s behavior observable. One observable effect that is classically associated with dynami-
cal systems is hysteresis (Case, Tuller, Ding, & Kelso, 1995; Gilmore, 1992; Kelso, 1995;
Tuller et al., 1994).
Consider for example our experimental task. In some conditions (referred to as coupled
sequential runs) rod-length will increase systematically to its maximum length and then de-
crease systematically to its minimum length. Hysteresis is the phenomenon observed when
the transition from “no” to “yes” (i.e., the belief of participants regarding the possibility to
reach the object) in the increase part of this coupled sequential run occurs at a larger rod-length
than the transition from “yes” back to “no” in the decrease part of the run (see Fig. 1A). This
effect reflects the fact that self-organized systems tend to hold on to the state that they reside
in. Hysteresis can be one of the observable consequences of a system having several (instead
of just one) relatively stable behavioral modes. The simultaneous existence of two or more
attractors is called “multistability” because there is more than one stable state for the system
to reside in. In the current context, this multistability means that the same rod can be judged
as enabling or as not enabling successful reaching.
Another phenomenon that is ubiquitous to biological systems is adaptation (e.g., Helson,
1964; Parducci, 1965; Parducci & Wedell, 1986). Adaptation can be seen as having the effect
of destabilizing the present state (desensitization), while stabilizing competing states (sensiti-
zation). Thus, adaptation leads to contrast, i.e., the tendency to give a different response than
on the previous trial. Generally, adaptation is believed to be a function of both intensity and
duration. Consider again our experimental task. If one is first handed a very long rod and
subsequently is handed a much shorter rod, then one is less likely to judge the task as possible
then if one was first handed a less long rod (this is the effect of intensity). Also, if one has
judged the task as possible on many consecutive trials, one is more likely to switch judgment
on the following trial (this is the effect of duration).
It is due to the effect of adaptation that another observable effect can be observed for
multistable dynamical systems; viz., enhanced contrast. Enhanced contrast is the opposite of
hysteresis and occurs when the two crossover points (at which the system changes to the other
attractor) do not overlap but “underlap” (Fig. 1B). Finally, critical boundary is found when the
change from one behavioral pattern to the other occurs at exactly the same point in the increase
and decrease part of a coupled sequential run (Fig. 1C). It is assumed that critical boundary
occurs when the effects causing hysteresis (i.e., tendency to cling to the present state) and
enhanced contrast (i.e., adaptation) cancel each other out. In this study, we will use hysteresis,
I. van Rooij et al. / Cognitive Science 26 (2002) 345–375 353
Fig. 1. Illustrations of (A) hysteresis, (B) enhanced contrast, and (C) critical boundary. Note that the transition in
the hysteresis and enhanced contrast sequence is depicted at 3 cm of the critical boundary. The critical boundary
and the size of the overlap are chosen for reasons of illustration and are not based on any theoretical or experimental
considerations.
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and its companion notions, enhanced contrast and critical boundary, as the empirical means to
determine the dynamic nature of imagined action. Part of the attractiveness of dynamic models
is derived from the fact that they can explain these three different effects by means of the same
underlying mechanism of originating and decaying attractors.
1.5. Model description
Within the DST approach many different models have been developed to account for patterns
of behavior. Given that the task we studied involved discerning which rods enabled successful
reaching and which did not, we used a dynamical model to account for behavior with two
attractor states. Tuller and colleagues (Case et al., 1995; Tuller et al., 1994) designed such a
model for speech categorization phenomena. Following the example of Tuller et al. we used
Eq. (1) to model our data.
V (x) = kx− 12x2 + 14x4, (1)
in which V(x), the collective variable of the system, represents a potential function with at most
two minima which correspond to “no” (i.e., the participant indicates the belief or judgment
that it is not possible to reach the object with the rod) and “yes” (the participant indicates the
belief or judgment that it is possible to reach the object with the rod), respectively. The state the
system is in regarding the imagined action is qualitatively denoted by x. The control parameter
k specifies the direction and the degree of tilt of the potential function V(x). As can be seen in
Fig. 2, for k = −1, only one stable state exists in the system (i.e., “no”). Increasing k forces
the function to tilt. Although the initial stable state continues to exist, the attractor becomes
more shallow. When the control parameter reaches the critical value−kc an additional attractor
becomes stable (“yes”). From this point on, until k reaches the second critical value, +kc, the
two stable states coexist (both “no” and “yes” are possible responses). When k reaches+kc, the
attractor corresponding to the first alternative ceases to exist. Increasing k further only deepens
the remaining attractor.
In Tuller et al.’s model (as in all attractor models) it is assumed that the system’s state, x,
changes over time under the influence of the attractor landscape. To incorporate the potential
effects of random influences and noise inherent in the system, we assume that the trajectory can
be thought of as a random walk (cf., e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Townsend & Ashby, 1983).
There are many possible ways in which one can implement the specifics of such a random walk,
but in general we assume that the mean drift2 in the random walk at x is a function of V′(x), such
that the drift is negative for V′(x) > 0 and positive for V′(x) < 0. This means that the system
Fig. 2. Potential landscape defined by Eq. (1) for different values of k (after Tuller et al., 1994).
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will tend to drift to the right on the x-axis for negative slope of the potential landscape and to
the left for positive slope of the landscape. The characteristic nature of the attractor states for
V(x) is such that for all states within an attractor well the system will tend to be pulled towards
the minimum of the well (see Fig. 2). Once the system is caught in an attractor well, the system
will tend to drift towards the minimum (where V′(x) = 0), and then meander (stochastically)
around this minimum. We say the system has settled when this situation occurs and assume
that a decision (“yes” or “no”) is made, and a response initiated, as soon as the system has
settled.
On each trial the system is assumed to start in some initial state, x0, and stochastically
change over time until it settles and a response is initiated. This initial state, x0, can in theory
lie anywhere on the x-axis, but it seems plausible to assume that after each trial the system
will drift back to the neutral point, x = 0. Further, it also seems plausible to assume that this
settling in the neutral point after a trial takes time, meaning that if the inter-trial interval (ITI)
is relatively short, the initial state for the following trial will be biased by the final state of the
system on the preceding trial. For example, if the response was “no” on the preceding trial (i.e.,
the system had settled in the “no”-attractor), then the initial state for the next trial will likely
be x0 > 0; provided, of course, that the ITI is short enough (see also Tuller et al., 1994, p. 8).
If this next trial instantiates an attractor landscape that is multistable (e.g., k = 0), then the
system will be more likely to settle in the “no”-attractor than had the initial state been x0 = 0.
As a result the model predicts an assimilative bias; i.e., all else being equal, responses on
subsequent trials tend to be the same.
As mentioned before, in our experiment sometimes rod-length is systematically increased
from minimum to maximum rod-length and subsequently systematically decreased from max-
imum back to minimum (ID-run), or vice versa (DI-run). If k would be a function of rod-length
alone, then, due to the assimilative bias, the model would predict the hysteresis effect for DI-
and ID-runs. This phenomenon is illustrated in Fig. 2. When k increases from −1 to +1, the
little black ball (representing the system’s state) will tend to stay in the “no” attractor (depicted
in Fig. 2). Conversely, when k decreases from +1 to −1, the little black ball will tend to stay
in the “yes” attractor. We will discuss now that k is assumed to be a function of more variables
than rod-length alone, and explain how this allows the model to also predict an effect opposite
to hysteresis, viz., enhanced contrast.
In the experiment, we manipulate the control parameter, k, by means of the independent
variable, rod-length. Following Tuller et al. (1994) we assume that the relationship between
the control parameter and the independent variable is not a one-to-one correspondence. Instead,
we assume that k is a function of (1) rod-length, (2) the level of adaptation (which is a function of
both repetitions, and length of rod on previous trial) and (3) random factors scaling the effect of
(2) such as perceptual and cognitive characteristics of the participant. The relationship between
the control parameter and rod-length can be symbolized by Eq. (2),3
k = λ+ S((Nno −Nyes)− λt−1), (2)
in which k specifies the value of the control parameter, λ, is linearly proportional to the length
of the rod on the present trial (where −1 ≤ λ ≤ +1), λt−1 is linearly proportional to the
length of the rod on the preceding trial (where−1 ≤ λt−1 ≤ +1), Nno is a growing function of
the number of accumulative repetitions of “no” and Nyes is a growing function of the number
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of accumulative repetitions of “yes.” S ≥ 0 and represents relevant perceptual and cognitive
characteristics of the participant that may fluctuate during the experiment.
In Eq. (2), two contrastive influences are incorporated: (a) adaptation as a function of the
length (“intensity”) of the rod on the preceding trial; i.e., the longer the rod on the preceding
trial the smaller k on the present trial (conversely, the shorter the rod on the preceding trial,
the larger k on the present trial), and (b) adaptation as function of repetitions (“duration”) of
a certain response; i.e., the more repetitions of “yes” the smaller k and conversely, the more
repetitions of “no” the larger k.
We already mentioned that due to a tendency to cling to the state the system resides in
(i.e., local assimilation) hysteresis can be observed in coupled sequential runs. However, if we
take the contrastive influences of previous rod-length and repetitions into account the opposite
effect, called enhanced contrast, can be observed as well.
Fig. 3 illustrates how the mechanism of Eq. (2) can lead to enhanced contrast in a coupled
sequential run. In Fig. 3, the relation between the control parameter and the rod-length is
illustrated for a coupled sequential run in which the rod-length first increases and then decreases
(ID-run). For the sake of clarity, we hold S constant and only look at the effect of previous
rod-length and accumulative responses. In an ID-run the participant is presented at first with
the smallest rod (bottom left in Fig. 3), and thus, will start with responding “no.” With each
next trial, the rod-length increments one step. With every next trial λt−1 will become larger
(i.e., less negative), but at the same time, Nno will become increasingly larger than Nyes (which
will remain zero). Due to the fact that Nno grows increasingly larger than Nyes with every next
trial, the increase in k will be larger than the increase in λ. When k reaches the value of +kc at
the first transition point (left-hand side in Fig. 3), the participant switches to “yes”-responses.
With every next trial Nyes will grow whereas Nno will remain constant. This will flatten the
slope of the still increasing k. The increase sequence is followed by a decrease sequence, and
at some point Nyes will start to outnumber Nno. In the initial part of the D-run this will cause
the decrease in k to be larger than the decrease in λ, resulting in a steep slope downwards
(right-hand side in Fig. 3). When −kc is reached again a transition occurs and the participant
will switch to no-responses again. Thus, Fig. 3 illustrates that for some S > 0, the transition
Fig. 3. Illustration of the relationship between the control parameter and rod-length, for fixed S > 0, in a coupled
sequential run in which rod-length first increases and subsequently decreases (see text for details).
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from “yes” to “no” occurs at a larger rod-length than the transition from “no” to “yes”; an
example of the enhanced contrast effect.
One can imagine that for certain settings of the parameters one may find that the first and
second transition occur at exactly the same rod-length. This critical boundary effect is relatively
rare, because the number of parameter settings that result in it is much smaller than the number
of parameter settings that lead to either hysteresis or enhanced contrast.
According to the attractor model that we present a response on trial t can be different from
the response on trial t − 1 for two reasons: (1) a transition has been induced by the change
in the control parameter k, or (2) a transition has occurred due to random influences (i.e., the
evolutionary trajectory is a random walk). If k is, say, systematically increased from some value
smaller than−kc to some value larger than+kc then always at least one transition from “no” to
“yes” will always occur. A transition will either occur at+kc (i.e., a type-1 transition) or before
+kc (i.e., a type-2 transition). It is of course possible that more than one type-2 transition occurs
before +kc is reached (e.g., for consecutive trials, each instantiating a multistable system, it is
possible to observe the response sequence: “no–yes–no–yes–. . . ”). Since, the possibility for a
type-2 transition is present for every trial that instantiates a multistable system, the probability of
observing at least one type-2 transition is larger if many consecutive trials instantiate multistable
systems.
We call the number of consecutive trials that each instantiate a multistable region the width
of the multistable region for a given sequence of trials (with sequence, here, we mean that
either k systematically increases or systematically decreases over trials). Note that the model
makes a prediction about under what conditions a wide or narrow multistable region will
be expected. Namely, as illustrated in Fig. 3, the contrastive influence of repetitions of the
same response is such that it narrows the multistable region in a sequence. In our analyses,
we use two measures of the width of the multistable region to test this prediction. First, we use
the number of switches observed in a given sequence as an index of the width of the multistable
region (note: in a narrower multistable region there will be less room for type-2 transitions).
As a second measure of the width of the multistable region we use the difference between the
longest rod inducing a “no”-response and the shortest rod inducing a “yes”-response within a
given sequence. This difference should be larger for a wider range of multistability than for a
narrower range of multistability.
2. Model predictions
We summarize the predictions that can be derived from the model for our experimental task.
Before discussing these predictions, we wish to clarify the distinction between assimilation
and hysteresis and the distinction between contrast and enhanced contrast, as we will use these
terms throughout the discussion of our results.
In the present context, contrast and assimilation are locally defined effects, i.e., defined at
the level of individual trials: (1) contrast is the tendency to give a different response on the
present trial than on the previous trial, while (2) assimilation is the tendency to give the same
response on the present trial as on the previous trial. We hypothesize that contrast is a result
of adaptation while assimilation is a result of a system’s resistance to change (i.e., stability).
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Thus, both adaptation and resistance to change are assumed to be continuously operational in
any cognitive system.
Enhanced contrast and hysteresis, on the other hand, are more globally defined, i.e., defined
at the level of coupled sequential runs (i.e., increase–decrease [ID-runs] and decrease–increase
[DI-runs]): (1) enhanced contrast is the effect when the switch from “no” to “yes” occurs
for a shorter rod-length than the switch back from “yes” to “no,” while (2) hysteresis is the
effect when the switch from “no” to “yes” occurs for a longer rod-length than the switch back
from “yes” to “no.” Enhanced contrast and hysteresis can be thought of as resulting from the
amplification of local contrast and local assimilation in the location of the 50% point on the
rod-length continuum in coupled sequential runs.
The interrelationship between Eqs. (1) and (2) as described above leads to the following
predictions for our experiment:
(1) There is a tendency in the dynamic system to remain in the state it resides in due to the
biasing effect of the final state of the preceding trial on the initial state for the present
trial. Thus, the model predicts an assimilative bias. This assimilative bias can be tested in
random sequences by inspecting the conditional probability of a “yes” or “no” response
on the present trial given a “yes” or “no” response on the preceding trial.
(2) Accumulative repetitions of “yes” and the presentation of “long rods” are assumed to
cause the multistable region to shift towards the upper end of the rod-length continuum
(i.e., to longer rods). Conversely, accumulative repetitions of “no” and “short rods” are
assumed to cause the multistable region to shift towards the lower end of the rod-length
continuum. Thus, the model predicts that the 50% point in a random sequence with
overall less “no” (more “yes”) responses should be lower (i.e., corresponding to a shorter
rod-length) than the 50% in a sequence with overall more “no” (less “yes”) responses
(we use the factor Range, discussed in Section 3, to test this prediction). The contrastive
effect of the previous rod-length can also be tested in random sequences by inspecting
the predictive power of rod-length on the preceding trial on judgment on the following
trial. In particular, the model predicts an inverse relationship between rod-length on the
previous trial and the probability of a “yes”-response on the present trial.
(3) The model predicts both hysteresis and enhanced contrast (and in rare cases, criti-
cal boundary as well). Although the finding of both patterns supports the model, it
does not provide a strong test. To have a strong test of the model we have to test the
relative frequency of these effects under conditions predicted by the model to affect
this relative frequency. For example, the model predicts that the higher the number
of repetitions of “yes” in ID-runs, where rod-length systematically increases and sub-
sequently systematically decreases (or of “no” in DI-runs) the greater the chance of
observing enhanced contrast and the smaller the chance of observing hysteresis. Con-
versely, the smaller the number of repetitions of “yes” in ID-runs (or of “no” in DI-runs)
the greater the chance of observing hysteresis and the smaller the chance of observing
enhanced contrast. In addition, the model predicts that observations of critical boundary
will overall be very limited. We test these predictions by inspecting the relative fre-
quency with which hysteresis, enhanced contrast and critical boundary occur in coupled
sequential runs.
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(4) Within the multistable region switches in judgment can occur as a consequence of
random disturbances. The narrower the multistable region gets (e.g., due to repetitions
of a certain response—see Fig. 3) the smaller the chance of observing switches of the
judgment. Also, the narrower the multistable region gets the smaller the difference
between the maximum rod-length for which a “no”-response is observed (Maxno) and
the minimum rod-length for which a “yes”-response is observed (Minyes).
3. Method
3.1. Participants
Five males and nine females, participated in the experiment. All but two female participants
were right-handed. The age of 13 participants ranged from 22 to 28 years. One male participant
was significantly older than the rest, viz., 56 years. The height of participants ranged from 1.56
to 1.88 m, with an average of 1.76 m. The average arm length was 0.59 m, with a range of
0.49–0.67 m. All participants volunteered to participate. All but one, who did not want to be
rewarded, were paid for their participation or participated as a means to fulfilling a course
requirement.
3.2. Materials
Rods with a diameter of 1.25 cm were used, ranging in length from 57.0 to 91.5 cm, in 1.5 cm
increments.4 The 24 rods were constructed from wood (density 0.67 g/cm3). Attached to each
rod was a handle of identical material with the length of 11.5 cm and a diameter of 1.25 cm. A
small disc divided the handle from the rod.
A 50 g PVC cylinder (diameter 5 cm, height 6 cm) was placed on a table (25 cm × 25 cm).
The height of the table was adjusted to the participant’s wrist height with the arm at the side.
The back of the cylinder was placed against a panel of 12.5 cm height and the front of the
cylinder was aligned with the front edge of the table.
3.3. Design
Each participant performed the judgment task under several conditions. There were three
kinds of sequences in which rods were given to the participant, namely (1) increase sequences
(I): rod-length increased from minimum to maximum in 1.5 cm increments; (2) decrease se-
quences (D): rod-length decreased from maximum to minimum in 1.5 cm increments; (3) ran-
dom sequences (R): the rods ranging in length from the minimum to maximum were randomly
assigned to the task. The two sequential conditions (1) and (2) were always coupled, result-
ing in two kinds of coupled sequential runs: ID- and DI-runs. Coupled sequential runs were
always followed by a random sequence (3), resulting in two possible blocks of runs, namely
increase–decrease–random (IDR) blocks and decrease–increase–random (DIR) blocks. The
random sequence served as a kind of buffer between the coupled sequential runs, and as the
condition in which to test for local assimilative and contrastive effects.
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For the rods two different ranges were used in the experiment, namely Range 1 of 57.0–
85.5 cm and Range 2 of 63.0–91.5 cm. Thus, there were two possible minima and maxima for
the three sequences described above. Within a given block, the minimum and maximum for
the three constitutive sequences (I, D and R) were the same.
The four possible combinations of block and range in the experiment were thus IDR-1,
IDR-2, DIR-1 and DIR-2. Each of these combinations occurred twice in one experimental
session, resulting in a total of 480 trials (2 ranges × 2 blocks × 3 sequences × 20 rods × 2
repeated measures) per participant. The block-range combinations were randomized within an
experimental session, with the constraint that each block-range combination appeared as often
in the first half of a session as in the second half.
3.4. Procedure
A participant was asked to bend forward, with the preferred arm stretching forward, as far
as possible (maintaining enough balance to stay flat on the feet). The distance between the
feet and the hand in this position was measured. Then the participant was asked to leave the
experimental room. To determine the place at which a participant had to make the judgment
we added 75 cm to the participants’ maximum reaching distance as measured. This place was
demarcated on the floor. The participant stayed at this place, in a normal, upright position,
during the entire experiment. Note that 75 cm is the median of the range of rod-lengths used.
Hence, for all participants approximately half of the rods would enable reaching, and half
would not.
While standing at the demarcated place it was explained to the participant that the goal was
to judge whether the cylinder on the table could be displaced with the tip of the rod from this
place while keeping the two feet flat on the floor. From behind a curtain an experimenter handed
a rod to the participant (i.e., during a trial participants had full vision of the rod but participants
had no idea about how the rods related to each other). The instruction was to hold the rod so that
it made an angle of approximately 45◦ upwards with the horizontal. Participants stood upright
at the demarcated place with the rod in one hand and reported whether they thought they were
able to displace the cylinder with a simple “yes” or “no”. After a participant had given the
categorical judgment the rod was returned to the experimenter who handed the participant a
new rod for which the participant again made a judgment. To ensure that the perceptual effect
of the previous trial would be carried over to the following trial, we tried to minimize the ITI
as much as possible. No feedback regarding accuracy was given. One experimental session
lasted approximately 1 h, including a short break after participants had completed half of the
trials.
4. Results
Most participants showed a transition in the judgment (reachable or not) in all sequences
(increase-, decrease- and random-sequences), that is, for 9 of the 14 participants at least 1
switch from “yes” to “no” (or vice versa) occurred across the rod-length continuum, in all
24 sequences. For three additional participants such a transition occurred in 22, 20 and 18
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sequences, respectively. All these 12 participants switched at least once between the two
judgments in all random sequences. The two remaining participants, however, did not. One
of these participants (Participant 6) categorized all rods as enabling successful reaching for
the cylinder, thus, producing a yes-response for all 480 trials. For the other participant (Par-
ticipant 13) a transition occurred in only three sequences (one in a random sequence, one
in a increase sequence, and one in a decrease sequence). It seems that these two partic-
ipants overestimated the distance reachable with the rods so much that the lower-end of
the range (57.0 cm) was still too high to evoke a perceptual transition. Because this led
to little or no variation in responses, these participants’ data were excluded from the
analyses.
Plotting the probability of a “yes”-response against rod-length for the remaining 12 par-
ticipants for the three types of sequences resulted in the distributions as depicted in Fig. 4.
The figure illustrates an effect of type of sequence. The rod receiving a yes-response 50% of
the time was on average smaller in increase sequences (viz., ±66.0 cm) than in the decrease
sequences (±70.5 cm). This difference is indicative of an overall enhanced contrast effect (see
also, Fitzpatrick, Carello, Schmidt, & Corey, 1994). Further, Fig. 4 shows that the length for
which there was a 50% point in random sequences (viz., ±67.5 cm) lies between the two 50%
points of the increase- and decrease-sequences. Note that some smaller rods (i.e., rods ranging
in length from 60.0 to 64.5 cm) were on average more often categorized as enabling successful
reaching in the two sequential runs than in the random runs. Some participants whose per-
sonal 50% category boundary fell on the lower-end of the parameter continuum caused this
divergence.
Finally, participants in this experiment tended to overestimate their reaching distance. Given
the individually defined distance to table (personal maximum reaching distance without rod+
75 cm) the expected 50% category boundary would be about 75 cm for all participants. The
observed 50% category boundaries for the three experimental condition depicted in Fig. 4 are
all lower than this.
Fig. 4. Percentage of “yes”-responses, averaged over participants, per rod-length for increase, random and decrease
sequences separately.
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4.1. Effects of sequence and range
To test the effect of sequence, suggested in Fig. 4, as well as a possible effect of range, a
direct logistic regression analysis was performed on the judgments (“yes” or “no”) for each
participant separately. Length (ranging from 57.0 to 91.5 cm) was entered as a continuous
predictor, and Sequence (increase, decrease and random) and Range (Range 1: from 57.0 to
85.5 cm, Range 2: from 63.0 to 91.5 cm) as categorical predictors. Given that all predictors
were entered simultaneously the variance accounted for by each is unique. Table 1 summarizes
for each participant the found β, and its significance level, for each predictor (we will denote
the mean β, as averaged over participants, by B).
Participants’ tendency to overestimate was captured by a large negative constant for all
participants (B = −36.02, SE = 2.27). Not surprisingly, also Length was a significant pre-
dictor for all participants; i.e., the probability of “yes”-response increased with increasing
length (B = 1.34, SE = 0.04). More importantly, we found that Sequence was a significant
predictor for most participants. Overall, the increase condition was associated with a higher
probability of “yes” (B = 1.34, SE = 0.23), and the decrease condition was associated with
a lower probability of “yes” (B = −0.63, SE = 0.42), as compared to the random condition.
A paired-samples t-test showed that β was on average larger in the increase condition than in
the decrease condition, t (11) = 4.04, p < .01 (hence, the overall “enhanced contrast” effect
in Fig. 4). Note, however, that at the individual level this contrastive effect was not significant
for five participants, and for two participants (7 and 10) the effect of sequence was even in
the opposite direction. Also, though Range did not add significantly to the predictive power of
the regression model at the individual level, its β was on average larger than zero (B = 0.58,
SE = 0.20), t (11) = 2.97, p < .05, indicating that on average the probability of “yes” was
lower in Range 2 as compared to Range 1 (i.e., when controlling for the effect of Length). This
effect of Range can be interpreted as being due to the contrastive influence of having overall
more “yes”-responses in Range 2 (consisting of more long rods) than in Range 1.
4.2. Local assimilative and contrastive effects
To test whether local contrastive or assimilative effects were present a logistic regression
was run on judgment (“yes” or “no”) in random sequences for each participant separately.
To test for assimilation, the response on the previous trial (Previous Response) was entered
as a categorical predictor. To test for an effect of adaptation level, the length of the rod on
the previous trial (Previous Length) was entered as a continuous predictor. To ensure that
the predictive value of Previous Response and Previous Length could not be attributed to
correlation between these variables and rod-length or range, Length (continuous) and Range
(categorical) were simultaneously entered in the logistic regression as well. Table 2 shows the
found β weights for Previous Response and Previous Length, and their significance level, for
each participant.
Based on the assumption that a dynamical system will tend to remain in the attractor it
is in, one expects participants to tend to give the same response on the present trial as they
did on the previous trial. In accordance with this prediction, we found a positive weight for
Previous Response in the regression analysis (B = 1.71, MSe = 0.84), which was on average
I.
va
n
Rooij
et
al./C
ognitive
Science
26(2002)345–375
363
364 I. van Rooij et al. / Cognitive Science 26 (2002) 345–375
Table 2
Beta weights (β), and their significance, for Previous Length and Previous Response, obtained in a direct logistic
regression on judgment, with Previous Length, Previous Response, Length and Range as predictors
Participant Previous Response Previous Length
β Significance β Significance
1 1.88 n.s. −0.07 n.s.
2 1.86 n.s. −0.11 n.s.
3 0.42 n.s. −0.02 n.s.
4 1.89 + −0.12 +
5 1.11 n.s. −0.07 n.s.
7 1.54 n.s. −0.04 n.s.
8 1.81 n.s. −0.12 +
9 2.61 ∗ −0.04 n.s.
10 1.97 + −0.09 +
11 3.00 + −0.14 ∗
12 2.42 + −0.09 n.s.
14 0.06 n.s. −0.10 n.s.
Average (B) 1.71 −0.08
Note: (∗) means p < .05, (+) p < .10, and (n.s.) means p ≥ .10.
significantly larger than zero, t (11) = 7.00, p < .001. This assimilative bias was (marginally)
significant at the individual level for 5 of the 12 participants, and at least directionally presented
for all participants (i.e., all β > 0). On the assumption that adaptation induces a contrastive
effect, one expects that the tendency to respond “yes” on a given trial is larger when the rod on
the previous trial was small, than when it was large. In accordance with this prediction, we found
a negative weight for Previous Length in the regression analysis (B = −0.08, MSe = 0.04),
which was on average significantly smaller than zero, t (11) = 7.87, p < .001. The contrastive
effect of previous rod-length was (marginally) significant at the individual level for 4 of the 12
participants, and at least directionally presented for all participants (i.e., all β < 0).
4.3. Response patterns in coupled sequential runs
To investigate the relative frequency of hysteresis, critical boundary and enhanced contrast
in coupled sequential runs a measure was required for the transition point in each increase and
decrease sequence independently. In 36 of the 192 sequential runs multiple transitions were
observed across the rod-length continuum. Given that we interpret such additional switches as
a result of random influences that cause the system to jump from one attractor to another, the
boundary of the multistable region is best estimated by the rod-length for which the last switch
occurred within a given sequence. In an increase sequence this last switch point was defined as
being in between the longest rod receiving a no-response and the subsequent rod. Conversely,
in a decrease sequence the last switch point would be in between the shortest rod receiving a
yes-response and its subsequent rod.
Each coupled sequential run (ID- and DI-runs) was coded for the type of response pat-
tern it showed. If the last switch point marked a shorter rod in the increase-sequence of a
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Table 3
Number of coupled sequential runs (out of total of eight) that resulted in either enhanced contrast, critical boundary
or hysteresis per participant
Subject Enhanced contrast Critical boundary Hysteresis
1 6 1 1
2 5 1 2
3 8 0 0
4 8 0 0
5 6 1 1
7 1 1 3
8 7 0 1
9 6 0 2
10 2 0 6
11 4 1 3
12 4 1 1
14 8 0 0
Note: Three coupled sequential runs for Participant 7 and two coupled sequential runs for Participant 12 could
not be coded as enhanced contrast, critical boundary or hysteresis, because no perceptual transition occurred in
those runs.
coupled run than in the decrease-sequence an enhanced contrast effect was coded. On the
other hand, hysteresis was coded if the rod for which the last switch occurred was longer in
the increase-sequence than in the decrease-sequence of a coupled run. A critical boundary
was coded when the last switch points were exactly the same for the two parts of a coupled
sequential run. The distribution of the three possible response patterns over participants is
depicted in Table 3. Five coupled sequential runs were excluded from the analyses because
no perceptual transition occurred. These were two runs for Participant 12 and three runs for
Participant 7 (see also Table 1). Of the total 91 remaining sequential coupled runs, 66 runs
(72.8%) showed an enhanced contrast effect and 20 runs (20.7%) showed a hysteresis effect
(the relative frequency of hysteresis and enhanced contrast that we observed across coupled
sequential runs is comparable to what Fitzpatrick, Carello, Schmidt, & Corey, 1994 observed
across participants). Critical boundary occurred in only six sequential coupled runs (6.5%),
and no more than once per participant.
4.4. Interaction of response pattern with order of coupled sequences
Because participants tended to overestimate the distance reachable, more “yes”- than “no”-
responses were given. As a consequence, the number of accumulative repetitions of “yes” in a
ID-run were, on average, larger than the accumulative repetitions of “no” in a DI-run. Hence,
the dynamical model predicts that the chance of observing enhanced contrast is greater, and
the chance of hysteresis is smaller, in ID- than in DI-runs.
An analysis of the frequencies of the two response patterns confirmed this prediction.
A Pearsonχ2-test with SequenceCoupling (ID-, DI-runs), and ResponsePattern (enhanced con-
trast, hysteresis) indicated a significant association between SequenceCoupling and
ResponsePattern, χ2(1) = 4.44, p = .035. Enhanced contrast occurred more frequently
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in ID-runs (37 times) than in DI-runs (29 times). Hysteresis on the other hand occurred more
frequently in DI-runs (14 times) than in ID-runs (6 times). Critical boundary occurred as often
in ID-runs (3 times) as in DI-runs (3 times).
4.5. Switches as a measure of multistability
As mentioned before, additional switches (i.e., alternating yes- and no-responses on suc-
cessive trials preceding the last switch point) were observed for some participants in some
sequential runs. Such additional switches occurred on 88 of the 3574 trials in sequential runs
Note that the number 3574 represents the total number of trials, 3840, minus the first trial of
each coupled sequential run and minus the trials in which a last switch point was observed. The
first trial was excluded because the trial preceding that trial was part of a random run (thus, a
switch on that trial would not be informative), and the last switch point was excluded because
only the switches that occur in addition to the last switch point are of interest here (i.e., those
switches that are brought about solely by random influences).
Two estimates of the size of the multistable region can be defined: (1) the number of ad-
ditional switches, and (2) the difference between the length of the longest rod eliciting a
no-response and the length of the shortest rod eliciting a yes-response (plus 1.5 cm to correct
for the increment size). We report analyses for both these estimates to test whether the width
of the multistable region is affected by repetitions as predicted by our model.
On average |(Nno − Nyes)S| gets larger in the second than in the first half of a coupled
sequential run. Because this increases the pace of change of k, this causes the multistable region
to be smaller in the second half of a coupled sequential run than in the first half. In a smaller
multistable region, there is less room for additional switches. Therefore, we hypothesized that
the number of additional switches would be larger in the first than in the second half of coupled
sequential runs. A Pearson χ2-test of association performed on the switches and non-switches
(excluding the first trial of each coupled sequential run and the trials on which a last switch point
was observed), for RunHalf (first half, second half of a coupled sequential run), showed that
indeed significantly more additional switches occurred in the first half of a coupled sequential
run (54 times) than in the second half (34 times), χ2(1) = 5.81, p < .05.5 This effect of
RunHalf was more prominent in decrease sequences (34 vs. 19 in first and second RunHalf,
respectively) than in increase sequences (20 vs. 15 in first and second RunHalf, respectively),
which can be attributed to the fact that |(Nno − Nyes)S| becomes much larger in decrease
sequences in ID-runs than in increase sequences in DI-runs, due to the fact that participants
overestimated their reaching distance to a large degree.
Also, we found that more additional switches occurred in Range 1 (61 times) than in Range
2 (27 times; χ2 = 13.70, p < .001). Interestingly, this effect of range was observable for both
increase and decrease sequences (see Fig. 5).
The effect of range in decrease sequences can again be explained in terms of the rela-
tively large number of accumulative repetitions of “yes” in D-runs due to the fact that par-
ticipants overestimated their reaching distance. The effect of range in increase runs, however,
is consistent with the two-attractor model as well. Namely, as can be seen in Fig. 4, even the
shortest rods used in the experiment were occasionally judged to enable successful reaching.
Further, the shortest rod in Range 2 (i.e., 63.0 cm) was judged as enabling successful
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Fig. 5. Number of additional switches observed in Range 1 and Range 2 for increase and decrease sequences
separately.
reaching once by two participants, and as enabling successful reaching even 50% of the time
by three participants. This means that the left boundary of the multistable region was not
only on average closer to the left end of the range of rod-lengths (i.e., shorter rods) but even
outside Range 2 for a considerable number of participants. Thus, for these participants, the
increase sequences in Range 2 started well within the multistable region. Consequently there
were simply fewer opportunities for switching in increase sequences in Range 2 as compared
to Range 1, which explains the low frequency of additional switches in Range 2 for increase
sequences.
A second estimate of the size of the multistable region is provided by the difference be-
tween the maximum rod-length inducing a no-response (Maxno) and the minimum rod-length
inducing a yes-response (Minyes), plus 1.5 to correct for the size of the increment. If only
one switch in judgment occurs in a given sequence then this estimate is zero. When at
least two switches occur in a given sequence then this estimate would be larger than zero,
but the actual size would depend on where on the rod-length continuum the “first” and
“last” switch occurred. We computed (Maxno − Minyes + 1.5) for all participants for all
Sequence×Range×RunHalf. A randomization test6 was performed to test for main effects and
interactions.
Although, the mean size of the multistable region, as estimated by (Maxno −Minyes + 1.5),
was found to be smaller in the second half (M = 0.130, SD = 0.23) than in the first half of
coupled sequential runs (M = 0.234, SD = 0.44), this difference was not significant (p = .26).
The main effect of Range was found to be marginally significant (p < .10) indicating that
the width of the multistable region, as estimated by (Maxno − Minyes + 1.5), tended to be
larger in Range 1 (M = 0.242, SD = 0.43) than in Range 2 (M = 0.122, SD = 0.24). No
interaction between Range and Sequence was found (p > .50), indicating that the effect of
Range was similar for increase and decrease sequences (though, theoretically the effect of
range in decrease sequences is distinct from the effect of range in increase sequences—see
earlier comments on the analysis of “additional switches”). In sum, the analyses on the two
estimates of the size of the multistable region give a very similar picture; the width of the
multistable region seems to be modulated by accumulated repetitions.
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5. Discussion
Clark (1997) challenged DST to explain behavioral phenomena that are considered to be
“representation-hungry” cases. We took up this challenge by examining to what extent a dynam-
ical model could account for participants’ reports about the predicted outcome of an imagined
action. The patterns of responses by participants were found to be in close agreement with the
predictions of a two-attractor model (Tuller et al., 1994).
First, it was found that in random sequences participants tended to give the same categorical
judgment as on preceding trials. This assimilative effect is in accordance with the notion that
a dynamical system tends to cling to the state it resides in (Prediction 1). Further, we observed
an inverse relationship between previous rod-length and probability of a “yes”-response, in-
dicating that the rod-length on a preceding trial had a contrastive effect. Also, we found that
on average the transition occurred at a shorter rod-length in Range 1 than in Range 2—an
effect that is consistent with the assumption that response repetitions have a contrastive effect
(Prediction 2).
In coupled sequential runs (ID- and DI-runs) we observed all three effects that are pre-
dicted by the model, viz., hysteresis, critical boundary, and enhanced contrast. As expected,
critical boundary was the rarest of the three. Because participants overestimated their reaching
distance to a large degree, much more accumulative repetitions of “yes”-responses occurred
in coupled sequential runs in which rod-length first increased and subsequently decreased
(ID-runs) than “no”-responses occurred in runs in which rod-length first decreased and then
increased (DI-runs). As predicted, enhanced contrast occurred more often, and conversely
hysteresis less often, in ID-runs as compared to DI-runs (Prediction 3).
Finally, more additional switches (alternating “no”- and “yes”-responses) were observed
when the multistable region was expected to be relatively large, than when it was expected to
be relatively small (Prediction 4). That is, more additional switches were observed in the first
part of a coupled sequential run (i.e., I in ID, and D in DI) as compared to the second part
of a coupled sequential run (i.e., D in ID and I in DI). Also, more additional switches were
observed in Range 1 as compared to Range 2. We found similar effects when the width of
the multistable regions was estimated by the difference between the longest rod leading to a
no-response and the smallest rod leading to a yes-response.
In sum, a simple dynamical model suffices to account for our experimental findings. The
pattern of results can be usefully described as a consequence of the interrelationship between
the control parameter k and the collective variable V(x) governing the system. In accordance
with the general DST perspective, the collective variable is assumed to be a non-reducible
description of the task-specific system. That is, the collective variable is not seen as the result
of a transformation or synthesis of representational units. Instead, this “imaging landscape” is
thought of as an emergent property of the system as a whole. Thus, even though the system as
a whole can be viewed as representing the (possibility of) imagined action, the attractor model
does not postulate internal representations in order to account for this capacity.
Before discussing the consequences of these results for Clark’s representation-hungry chal-
lenge, we will examine the relation between our results and other experimental findings. The
finding that participants tended to overestimate the distance reachable is in correspondence
with the general finding in other experiments that participants without using tools tend to
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overestimate their reaching distance (e.g., Carello et al., 1989; Heft, 1993; Robinovitch, 1998;
Rochat & Wraga, 1997). As we noted in our discussion of the nature of our task, Heft (1993)
indicates that the overestimation of the reaching distance reflects the interaction of higher
cognitive processes with perceptual processes. Hence, the fact that we find overestimation in-
dicates that higher cognitive processes play a role in our experiment as well. Thus, this finding
further corroborates our suggestion that our task can be used as a representation-hungry case.
Furthermore, our results are comparable to the results of experiments of Fitzpatrick et al.
(1994) in which participants were allowed to inspect a slope either visually or haptically (i.e.,
by probing with a rod). Participants had to judge whether a slanted surface afforded upright
stance when both visual and haptic information was available without actually standing on
that surface. Fitzpatrick et al. (1994) also found enhanced contrast and hysteresis effects at the
level of the individual participants. This indicates that the dynamical model we applied to our
task might be more generally applicable to different cases of simple imagination.
Although our main aim here merely is to show that a dynamical account of imagined action
is possible, we will try to indicate briefly why a dynamical account might even be thought to
be preferable to a representational account. In accordance with the general DST perspective,
our model assumes that all dynamical systems tend to hold on to the state they reside in, and
that hysteresis follows directly from the organization of the system. Enhanced contrast can be
understood as arising from the effect of adaptation on the control parameter (which in turn
modulates the emerging behavioral pattern of the dynamical system). Thus, by means of the
same model both hysteresis and enhanced contrast can be accounted for. Although there may
be representational explanations for each phenomenon (hysteresis, enhanced contrast, critical
boundary) separately, we fail to see a unified representational explanation for them taken
together.
Consider how a possible representational account would fare with respect to hysteresis.
One could argue that the representations underlying the judgment are more active or more
accessible when they have just been accessed (e.g., residual-activation, facilitative priming,
etc.). In effect this would cause the representational system to “tend to hold on to” prior used
representations, leading to an assimilative effect. This type of explanation, however plausible,
has a problem when it needs to account for the occurrence of enhanced contrast as well. To
explain the contrast effect one could argue for some mechanism that causes the representations
underlying the judgment to be less active, or less accessible when those same representations
have just been accessed (e.g., repetition blindness, deactivation or inhibition). In effect this
will cause the representational system to be more sensitive to the difference between a current
situation and the one just encountered, leading to a contrastive effect. The problem, however
is that the two representational explanations of hysteresis and enhanced contrast seem to be
hard to integrate (if not mutually exclusive). Moreover, it is not clear how the two mechanisms
would give rise to the systematicity in the occurrence of hysteresis and enhanced contrast that
we observed in the experiment and that follow from the dynamical model in a straightforward
way.
Finally, and perhaps most speculatively, we would like to question once again the “intuitive
desire” for a representational explanation. Perhaps one could come up with one, along the lines
we indicate above or otherwise. But why would one want to if there is an alternative and simpler
account available? The motto; “don’t use representations in explanation and modeling unless
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you really have to” can be understood as an instantiation of Occam’s razor. Representations
form an additional assumption in an account of observable behavior, and this assumption is
not entirely without problems, as can be seen from the widespread disagreements about their
exact nature, and the computational problems surrounding their efficient storage and usage.
One of the underlying reasons for wanting a representational explanation may be the idea
that representational models provide a mechanism whereas dynamical accounts such as the
one we give above merely are convenient ways of describing the data. However, we think
this suggestion reflects a tendency within cognitive science to equate “mechanism” with
“representational–computational account.” In our view, both representational and dynami-
cal models provide a mechanism in the sense that they both specify, formally, the constraints
that are thought to govern the underlying physical–causal processes. The important difference
between the different kinds of models lies not in their relation to the actual mechanism, but
in what they presuppose concerning the nature of the mechanism. The tendency to equate
representational models with mechanisms on the exclusion of alternatives may have to do with
the fact that the utilization of representations is the standard cognitivist way of creating a
mechanism: viz., it is the standard way of creating a computational model that shows behavior
similar to the cognitive phenomena of interest. However, a dynamical model is utilized in
exactly the same way. Both kinds of models can be implemented in computers, and in both
cases the resulting behavior is to be compared to the cognitive phenomena studied. The ul-
timate question regarding the proposed mechanisms, of course, is simply which mechanism
is instantiated by the cognitive system. We see no reason to suspect that the brain is less fit
to implement dynamical than representational models (if anything, the contrary seems more
likely). Since the characterizations of models can play an important (heuristic) role in neuro-
scientific research, we think having an alternative non-representational mechanism available
for certain cognitive phenomena is of great importance to cognitive science. Of course, an
important reason to use representations has been that no other account of cognitive behavior
with a comparable formal rigor was available. The question “can this behavior be explained
without using representations?” has been close to a rhetorical one over the last few decades. We
feel, however, that the recent rise of DST may end this situation. To be sure, we do not doubt
that representations have played an important role in the explanation of cognitive behavior and
that they will continue to do so. Yet, we claim that in every case of cognition one has to ask the
question whether representations are necessary to explain the phenomena at hand, before one
starts building models on the basis of them. The successes of the representational approach
should not blind one to the importance of this question. One is reminded of the astronomers
who, following Plato, started their investigations of the heavens on the assumption that the
movement of the stars and planets was bound to be circular. And although the Ptolomeic sys-
tem was capable of explaining most of the observable phenomena by means of this undisputed
assumption, the question whether circles were really necessary to account for this class of
observable phenomena turned out to be a good one to ask.
Cognitive science has made large steps forward in understanding human behavior. One of
the main reasons for this was that the representational approach made it possible to build
formal models that could be used to generate and test hypotheses. In a fruitful interaction
between experimental data and mathematical models, the understanding of cognitive behavior
improved at a high speed. Representational cognitive science was all the more successful
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because alternative views experienced great difficulties in constructing models at a simi-
lar level of formalization. It is, however, precisely in this respect that we value the DST
approach, because it does provide a reasonable, formalized, model-oriented, and empiri-
cally applicable alternative explanation of behavioral and cognitive phenomena. The present
paper indicates that this approach can be applied even to a case of representation-hungry
cognition.
Notes
1. Thus, the label ‘traditional cognitive science’ encompasses classical models based on
symbolic representations (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Newell, 1980) and standard connectionist
models based on distributed representations (e.g., Smolensky, 1988; Van Gelder, 1992).
Although connectionist models are often dynamic in nature, many models still confer to
the traditional representational approach. Port and Van Gelder (1995, pp. 3, 34) for in-
stance say about connectionism’s bible (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986; Rumelhart &
McClelland, 1986) that “the classic PDP style connectionism is little more than an
ill-fated attempt to find a half-way house between the two world-views (. . . ). Much
standard connectionist work (e.g., modeling with layered backprop networks) is just a
variation on computationalism, substituting activation patterns for symbols.” See also
Clark (1997, pp. 58–59), Thelen and Smith (1994, p. 42), and Freeman (1995, p. 117).
2. The drift, v, in the random walk is assumed to be a Gaussian random variable with mean
µv = f (dV/dx) and standard deviation σv. It is assumed that on each discrete time step
the random walk proceeds by moving a “step” left on the x-axis (v < 0) or right (v > 0)
or stay at the same position on the x-axis (v = 0).
3. Tuller et al. (1994) specified a slightly different relationship between the control param-
eter k and the experimental variable λ. First, they included a step function for the effect of
repetitions; i.e., repetitions were assumed to take effect only after some critical number
of repetitions were reached. Second, they defined the influence of λ as adding to the
initial value of the control parameter k within a coupled sequential run (denote by k0 by
Tuller et al.). We simply define k as a direct function of λ for each trial. Third, Tuller
et al. incorporated in their equation the value of λ at the other extreme from its initial
state (denote by λf by Tuller et al.). We believe that our specification is simpler and qual-
itatively equivalent to Tuller et al.’s specification at the level of analyses performed by
both Tuller et al. and ourselves. That is, we, like Tuller et al., test mainly for qualitative
predictions of the model, and these qualitative data cannot decide which specification
is better. Finally, we felt the need to include the parameter λt−1 to account for the con-
trastive influence of the length of a rod on the preceding trial in random sequences.
Possibly the fact that Tuller et al. (1994, p. 5) found mixed results when testing for local
assimilative and contrastive effects in random sequences may be due to the fact that they
did not correct for this factor in their analyses. We would like to note that the apparent
differences between Tuller et al.’s and our model are in a sense irrelevant for the main
thesis of this article. Supporting DST as an approach to modeling of imagined action
does not imply commitment to any particular form of Eq. (2).
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4. Psychophysics studies (see, e.g., Morgan & Watt, 1989) suggest that the Weber fraction
(I/I) for length discrimination is approximately 0.05. Given that the increment used
in our experiment was only 1.5 cm, the fraction between the increment and rod-length
consequently ranged from 0.026 (viz., 1.5 cm/75.0 cm) to 0.016 (viz., 1.5 cm/91.5 cm).
This means that the direction of parameter change is presumably not perceivable for
participants from one trial to another (at least, in a sequential condition). On most
occasions the fact that the hand-held rod is longer or shorter than a preceding rod does
not become apparent within less than three or more trials.
5. Since additional switches, by definition, occur before the “last switch point,” and “en-
hanced contrast” was the most common effect in coupled sequential runs, additional
switches tended to occur in the “lower half’ (viz., before the last switch point) in in-
crease runs, and in the “upper half” of decrease runs. Graphs plotting number of addi-
tional switches against rod-length do not indicate a strict separation though. This may
be due to the fact that individual data are too noisy, and that averaging over participants
makes the separation invisible (because every participant has a different 50% point).
This is why we chose to just test for associations between different conditions, with total
number of additional switches as the dependent variable.
6. Because the scores on (Maxno − Minyes + 1.5) were not normally distributed (viz., a
mode located at zero) we chose to do a randomization test instead of an ANOVA. The
randomization test is a non-parametric alternative to ANOVA, and hence does not make
any assumptions about how scores are distributed (Edgington, 1986). In our randomiza-
tion test, we used 5,000 randomly sampled permutations of the dataset as a reference
set.
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